I Agree!

[KMayUSA6060]

I think there is certainly a place for sabermetrics, but what has been lost is the balance of sabermetrics to actual field experience.

[packs]

Or how about actually watching the game? I remember not too long ago I said that Bernie Williams was one of the most clutch hitters I ever saw. I watched him play every day for his entire career. Every day, every game. And then somebody came in with some absurdly inane statistic to try to prove to me, a guy who watched someone play every day, that I was wrong because of some obscure number.

[drcy]

I work in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, and my saying about AI is that the computer scientists miss the forest for the trees, while the philosophers miss the trees for the forest.

[egri]

I read Moneyball a while back, and thought the whole thing was a lot of bunk. In the section about the 2002 draft, Beane did everything short of shout from the rooftops about how great Nick Swisher and Jeremy Brown were going to be. Swisher was OK, but the pick after him was Cole Hamels. Brown’s career consisted of 10 at bats, and the pick after him was Jon Lester. Then at the end, when it looked like Beane was going to the Red Sox and it talked about moves he was going to make, he would’ve gutted the core of a team that two years later, won the World Series. He did a lot of complaining about how the playoffs were a crapshoot, but the Yankees were just coming off of four championships in five years, and other small market teams (Braves, Twins, Marlins) were putting together successful playoff runs while Oakland kept getting bounced in the first round. There’s always luck involved, but when it’s happening to everyone but Oakland, there’s something besides that going on.

[Peter_Spaeth]

I think the metrics work better for established big leaguers than for prospects. Until a guy has faced ML pitching for a while, you just don't know if he can hit the breaking stuff consistently.

I distrust almost any anecdotal assessment of a "clutch" hitter, sorry. Personal observation, however extensive, tends to be prone to a great deal of bias and subjectivity.

[Neal]

I mostly agree. It certainly has a place in baseball, although it is given too much weight in some decisions.

[packs]

Originally Posted by Peter_Spaeth

I think the metrics work better for established big leaguers than for prospects. Until a guy has faced ML pitching for a while, you just don't know if he can hit the breaking stuff consistently.

I distrust almost any anecdotal assessment of a "clutch" hitter, sorry. Personal observation, however extensive, tends to be prone to a great deal of bias and subjectivity.

If you didn't watch the games then there's nothing for you to distrust. I did watch them. It's the same as knowing who you don't want up in a big spot because you watched the guy play everyday. I wouldn't want Giancarlo Stanton up in the bottom of the 9th no matter how many home runs he hits or what a stat says. I can just tell he's going to strike out because I watch him every day.

[clydepepper]

...on a side note, indirectly related to the subject I started:

In light of the way pitching is currently used, increase daily rosters to 30 and contract the two teams in Florida.

Because of the players' union,you could never contract teams without somehow maintaining the same total number of players.

[steve B]

Moneyball - the book- struck me as being more about having a team that was consistently competitive on a small budget than about winning. That also assumes that a team that always has some chance will be more profitable than one that's hopeless.


Some of the new stats do seem to matter, but there's a lot of things in the game that aren't easily measured. The last three years of his career Don Baylor went to the world series with three different teams. Boston was 5th the year before and after (Although he was with them most of 87.
Minnesota, was 6th the year before, and 2nd the year after (he only played 20 games for them, but they only won by 2 ) The As were a good team, being 3rd in 87, and first again in 89.

How much influence did he have on those teams down the stretch? That's hard to put numbers to, but I think it's likely he had some.

Also hard to put numbers to is the group of players who are really pretty good, come to Boston and just don't do well at all, but are fine after they leave. Management? difficult fans? A wall that makes righthanders especially change their swing? difficult press? I've seen all that blamed. But there isn't really a stat for it.

[rats60]

Originally Posted by Peter_Spaeth

I think the metrics work better for established big leaguers than for prospects. Until a guy has faced ML pitching for a while, you just don't know if he can hit the breaking stuff consistently.

I distrust almost any anecdotal assessment of a "clutch" hitter, sorry. Personal observation, however extensive, tends to be prone to a great deal of bias and subjectivity.

Bill James disagrees with you. James believes one of the big flaws with WAR is it doesn't account for Clutch performance. WAR is based on theoretical wins and not actual wins. I agree with James, but if you are a fan of Mike Trout and Clayton Kershaw, you sure would want to ignore "clutch."

[Peter_Spaeth]

Originally Posted by rats60

Bill James disagrees with you. James believes one of the big flaws with WAR is it doesn't account for Clutch performance. WAR is based on theoretical wins and not actual wins. I agree with James, but if you are a fan of Mike Trout and Clayton Kershaw, you sure would want to ignore "clutch."

I'm fine using clutch if it is based on a reasonable statistic and not a subjective factor.

[JustinD]

Originally Posted by Peter_Spaeth

I think the metrics work better for established big leaguers than for prospects. Until a guy has faced ML pitching for a while, you just don't know if he can hit the breaking stuff consistently.

I distrust almost any anecdotal assessment of a "clutch" hitter, sorry. Personal observation, however extensive, tends to be prone to a great deal of bias and subjectivity.

+1 On the money.