Quote:
Originally Posted by BillyCoxDodgers3B
At the very least, it would be nice if the new metric would more greatly compliment a player's previous recognition. If a player is almost entirely forgotten about when there are so many alive who saw him play, that speaks more to me than anything a new metric has to say. Yes, Grich won a few awards, but he never led the league with any dizzying stats. In fact, the only three instances where he did so was once in games played (who cares) and once in HR with a whopping 22. (Side note: 22 HR led the league?!). Oh, and WAR one season, a stat which had yet to be created. He retired nearly 40 years ago and it always felt like his name was lost to time. Even if he had been moderately superb, logic would dictate that he'd have been mentioned with exponentially more frequency. But all was quiet for so long until WAR came about, and BOOM, he's a legend?
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We know that there are aspects of baseball that have been underappreciated in the past, which are now more understood. For example, probably because of how exciting they are, people overrated the value of a stolen base. Especially because they did not deduct the damage of a caught stealing. It is hard to get on base, so wiping out a baserunner and adding an out is a big deal. Gaining an extra base is comparatively a smaller deal. It is why a player needs to have roughly a 75% success rate to make stealing bases a net positive.
Similarly, walks were underrated, while hits were overrated. When the bases are empty, a single and a walk are practically the same thing. In essence OBP is a better indicator of value to a team that batting average.
Information like this exposed some players who were seen as far more valuable than they actually were. In particular, high batting average, low power players, and fast players whose stolen base rates were not elite. The biggest example might be Lou Brock, but it is also why Ichiro was an excellent player, but has a lower WAR than other star players who had a higher OBP.
Similarly, these ideas also shed light on players who were undervalued. Specifically, players who had a high OBP and lowish batting average. Bobby Grich is a primary example.
All that said, the formula for WAR was not 'given to Moses at Sinai'. It is a composite stat that makes assumptions. The positional adjustments are a major factor which can be confusing, and are why players at positions (like 2nd base) which traditionally have been weaker offensive positions will have a higher offensive WAR than players at other positions. Whether this should be this way (and certainly the degree that it is this way) is up for discussion.
Defensive metrics remain subject to many assumptions as well. Should we give a player benefit for positioning, or focus on how hard a play was? Has this changed over time given that players used to position themselves and now it is done from the dugout...
Lots to discuss. The conceptual ideas behind WAR aren't (to me) particularly difficult to follow, even if I never bothered to run through the exact math for each component. Here's the link to Baseball Reference's version...
https://www.baseball-reference.com/a...position.shtml