This needs a reply.
"The problem with WAR is that it yields premiums attached to players who clearly do not deserve them. That is precisely how the Cubs got stuck paying Jason Heyward 184 million dollars over 8 years."
Heyward's problem was just a total collapse. His hitting fell off a cliff (and his fielding took a hit too). Dropping from a 117 OPS+ to a 68 OPS+ is going to hurt your value. WAR recognizes this (Heyward was a below average player last year by its measure). There are issues with measuring defense (see below), but the real problem with Heyward isn't so much that his defense was over-valued, it's that he forgot to how to hit as soon as he showed up in Chicago.
"both OPS+ and wRC+ give more accurate results regarding true player value, although you then have to make mental adjustments for defense and baserunning."
A mental adjustment isn't going to do it, you need a way to measure defense and base running. Without measurements you get people thinking that Derek Jeter was actually a good defensive shortstop and similar crazy talk. Rfield and Rbaser are attempts to measure these things (and inputs into the WAR calculation for fielding and running, respectively). They're not perfect - centerfielders stealing catches from corner outfielders is a known issue, for example - but they're better than just watching the guys play and sliding your evaluation up or down. We've got people working on the defensive stats, and they'll improve with time. (As they have already. UZR is much better than fielding percentage.)
"With regard to defense, I found it most interesting that about a month ago, Ken Rosenthal, confronting the gent who is in charge of calculating "defensive runs saved" (a key component of the current WAR), got the latter to admit on MLB Now that a defensive run saved is not actually a defense run saved, because the context of the defensive play is totally ignored."
This isn't a problem with WAR, it's really a philosophical choice. The wins that WAR measures are the wins that you could expect a player to generate if he was dropped down into a random team. That's why replacement level is a generic figure and not scaled to the actual guy in AAA who would replace the player. And it's why the context of the play is ignored.
"Personally, I do not believe the creation of single stat to measure overall player value in such a way that it may be compared to all other players is even possible. It is based on the premise that the "five-tool" player (one who can hit, hit with power, throw, run and field) is more valuable than one who lacks one of the five or more. This is a fallacy for two reasons: (1) all tools are not equally valuable--they never have been and never will be; and (2) the value of each of the tools varies with the player's position."
And I don't understand this part. Frank Thomas was not a five-tool player. He really only had two tools. But WAR loves him, because he was so good at hitting. The all-inclusive stats don't weight each tool equally - actually they don't talk about tools at all. They weight each run (produced or saved) equally, and not all tools contribute the same number of runs (for most players running is pretty marginal, for example), so they don't necessarily end up privileging the guys who have more tools over those who have fewer.
As to the second point. A HR from a shortstop is no more valuable than a HR from a left fielder. But of course it's also harder to play shortstop than it is to play left field (this is why I always played left field in little league, and the kids who were actually good at baseball played short). In WAR this is reflected in a positional adjustment - basically left fielders are penalized for playing an easy defensive position and shortstops are given a bonus for playing a hard one. So if you are a HR hitting shortstop, you both get credit for hitting home runs, AND you enjoy the positional adjustment for playing the harder defensive position.
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